About Me
I am an Assistant Professor at the UT Austin Economics Department. I completed my Ph.D. in Economics at MIT in 2025. I am primarily interested in Economic Theory.
My research explores how information shapes outcomes in strategic interactions. I study how information can be designed to incentivize coordination, and how private information can be reliably aggregated. Beyond information-related questions, I am also interested in economic phenomena—such as money and commodity flows, matching, and decentralized markets—that can be studied using similar theoretical tools.
Research
- Limits of Global Games [new version coming soon]
- Approximate Common Knowledge of Higher-Order Beliefs and Equilibrium Outcome Continuity (with S. Morris and D. Bergemann)
- A Revelation Principle for Rationalizability (with O. Gossner)
- Strong Information Design (with O. Gossner) [new version coming soon]
- Strategic Type Spaces (with O. Gossner) [submitted]
- Information Aggregation Mechanisms
